Abstract This paper proposes a novel model of the hospital industry in the United
Introduction
The nonprofit share of total hospital capacity has remained relatively stable (about 70%) for decades, while the average size of for-profit hospitals has steadily increased, approaching that of nonprofit hospitals. Theoretically, convergence in size is possible when agents can choose the hospital ownership form and the hospital strategic behaviors that offer the best outcome given the existing set of institutional rules and regulations. Since those rules and regulations often differ depending on hospital ownership, legal changes over time should differentially affect the behavior of hospitals depending on their ownership type. One prediction of the model is that ideal hospital size under some rules may differ by ownership form, and may change when those rules change. I show that hospitals with different ownership forms may choose different optimal sizes, and present data showing a convergence in size over time which is highly consistent with changes in regulatory, tax and demographic factors that affect choice of hospital ownership and capacity, rather than differences in organizational objectives. The findings have important implications for the policy debate concerning nonprofit and for-profit firms.
A number of authors have conducted extensive surveys of the literature on non-profit organizations. 1 Some papers question whether and to what extent nonprofit and for-profit hospitals differ. 2 However, these studies generally neglect exploration of the process by which the two ownership types grew similar. The theoretical effort to explain differences in behavior, efficiency, and quality of care between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals relies on differences in objectives. In particular, it promotes the idea that when a firm is not organized with the explicit goal of maximizing profits, applying conventional neoclassical models of firms is not appropriate. However, the findings in this paper suggest that the difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals may not be constant over time.
Evidence on convergence presented in this paper, along with the large body of research on ownership conversions (see e.g. Gaynor and Haas-Wilson 1999) , highlights the importance of the economic and regulatory environments in which hospitals with different ownership types operate. I focus on the possibility that hospitals choose their ownership type (nonprofit versus for-profit status) and attendant regulatory environment strategically. My model and empirical evidence both suggest that the differential ability to benefit from a given ownership status, and not some underlying difference in objectives, accounts for discrepancies in behavior across hospitals. Specifically, I present a model in which firms have identical objectives yet heterogeneous distributive constraints that yield different ownership forms. In contrast to the existing literature, this approach relies neither on different ownership type-specific objectives nor on market failure to generate an equilibrium in which both ownership types are chosen by a strictly positive fraction of hospitals.
Changes in the economic environment alter firms' incentives to maintain a given ownership type. This in turn induces firms to modify their capacity and encourages some firms to switch their ownership type. This approach suggests that positive demand shocks, negative supply shocks, and the changing nature of government involvement in the healthcare market may explain the growing similarity in size. I test these predictions by constructing measures of the model's parameters and analyzing the historical convergence using state and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level data.
The paper is organized as follows: section "The dynamics of the US hospital market" describes the convergence between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals observed over the past 40 years in the U.S. Section "A model of ownership choice" presents the theoretical model, which provides a rationale for the coexistence of for-profit and nonprofit firms in the same market. That is consistent with original differences in capacity and predicts subsequent convergence between the two ownership types. Using the American Hospital Association's Annual Survey database from 1970 to 1998 and regional demographic data from the U.S. census and other sources, section "Empirical analysis" provides a closer look at the convergence process across different locations to test the theoretical predictions. Section "Discussion" considers the policy implication of the analysis. White (1982) suggested that for-profit hospitals played an important role in the early growth of the industry. 3 These hospitals were small proprietary institutions, owned by doctors who wanted to provide facilities for themselves and for the community (Gray 1991) . This type of hospital gradually disappeared throughout the century; by 1960 its market share had declined to 15%. For-profit hospitals in small communities and rural areas were often replaced by nonprofit hospitals, or even changed their ownership status to the nonprofit form directly. The persistently large share of beds (about 70%) found in nonprofit hospitals over the period from 1960 to 2000 and the fact that many nonprofit hospitals originated as charitable institutions has led to the notion that nonprofit dominance stems from altruistic motives.
The dynamics of the US hospital market
Despite the fact that nonprofit share is persistent in the US hospital market, Gray (1991) notes four significant ways in which nonprofit hospitals grew similar to for-profit hospitals:
(1) a growing reliance of nonprofit hospitals on revenues from the sale of services versus donations, (2) a dependence on economic performance for gaining access to capital, (3) a decline in local control resulting from the rise of the multi-institutional systems, and (4) growing involvement of nonprofit hospitals in types of hybrid arrangements, such as management and departmental contracts, restructuring, joint ventures and alliances. 4 However, another important trend was overlooked-a growing similarity in capacity of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Little empirical work has focused on the impact of ownership form on hospitals' capacity choice (Hansmann et al. 2003) . Figure 1 presents the ratio of the average number of beds per nonprofit hospital to the average number of beds per for-profit hospital during the period from 1928 to 2000.
Between 1928 and the early 1960s nonprofit hospitals maintained on average more than three times as many beds per hospital as their for-profit counterparts. By 2000 the average nonprofit hospital was only 32% larger than the typical for-profit hospital. 5 While the downward sloping part of the nonprofit-to-for-profit ratio curve begins in the mid-1950s, it is not clear that any dramatic change took place at that time that might have triggered subsequent convergence. A more sensible starting point would be the introduction of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965, with the downward sloping segment 3 In 1928, the share of for-profit hospitals was 43.6%, which was similar to the share of nonprofit hospitals (43.9%) and with government hospitals accounting for the remaining 12.5%. 4 "Business terminology and business thinking have pervaded the nonprofit hospital world …. reliance on the sale of services for economic survival has important consequences … nonprofit status can become more of a convenience than a necessity or an expression of philosophy." (Gray 1991) . Since nonprofit hospitals generate most of their revenue from sales of services, they fit Hansmann (1980) definition of "commercial nonprofits." 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Nonprofit-to-For-Profit Ratio Fig. 1 Convergence in average number of beds per hospital, between nonprofits and for-profits. Sources: 1928 , 1935 and 1940 : White (1982 ). 1946 between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s attributable to cyclical fluctuations that appear to characterize the earlier data.
The need for public and nonprofit hospitals to provide free or subsidized services substantially declined as the government began subsidizing purchases of medical care directly through programs like Medicare and Medicaid (White 1979) . As the cost of Medicare rose rapidly, the government began requiring hospitals to have government approval for the purchase of major equipment, the expansion of existing medical facilities, and the construction of new facilities through certificate of need (CON) rules. 6 In 1983, a fundamental change to the hospitals' environment took place-the introduction of the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). Under the new system, hospitals were reimbursed on the basis of a fixed payment per patient. This payment was independent of the actual cost incurred and depended on the diagnosis of the patient at the time of admission. Hospitals reacted to the PPS by limiting services, and for the first time in the history of Medicare, the number of Medicare admissions declined (Raffel and Raffel 1989) . Although hospitals changed their behavior rather radically, the convergence trend, presented in Fig. 1 , was not disrupted by the introduction of the PPS. However, the reasons for the continued convergence process changed. Table 1 presents the growth rate of the average number of beds per hospital by ownership type and illustrates the pre-and post-PPS dynamics in the convergence process. Prior to the introduction of the PPS in the early 1980s, both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals grew in scale. For-profit hospitals grew at a rate of more than 5% per year, whereas nonprofit hospitals grew at about 2.3% per year, leading to convergence in size.
After the introduction of PPS, for-profit hospitals continued to expand, albeit at a markedly lower rate. Nonprofit hospitals, on the other hand, contracted. Government hospitals experienced a modest decline in average size throughout most of the period. The decline was Percentile FP mainly attributable to the changing role of government, as subsidizing medical care gradually supplanted the production of hospital services. 7 Figure 2 presents a percentile-percentile graph that illustrates the dissimilarity between the size-distribution of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals in a given year, as well as demonstrating the convergence of the size-distributions over time. Percentiles for the for-profit hospitals appear on the x-axis while percentiles for the nonprofit hospitals appear on the y-axis. The 45 • line represents a situation in which the size distribution of nonprofit and for-profit hospital is identical. I illustrate the change over time in the relative size of nonprofit and for-profit providers by using three curves: for 1970, 1982 and 1998 . A point on any of these contours corresponds to a pair of percentile points for an identical hospital's capacity. For example, the pair (0.5, 0.2) on the 1970 curve means that a hospital in the 50th percentile of the for-profit size-distribution had the same number of beds as a hospital in the 20th percentile of the nonprofit size-distribution. By 1998, the median for-profit hospital utilized the same number of beds as a hospital in the 43rd percentile of the nonprofit size-distribution.
It is clear from Fig. 2 that the size distribution of for-profit hospitals has approached that of the nonprofit hospitals. In 1998, for-profit hospitals in the 25th percentile and below were even larger than their nonprofit counterparts. David (2009) uses similar data to study the determinants of hospitals' capacity choice. Specifically, data regarding admissions, lengths-of-stay and occupancy rates show that although most of the convergence in capacity is replicated by the convergence in the number of admissions, medical practice (represented by average length of stay) contributed to the growing similarity between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals as well. Moreover, analysis of hospital-level data reveals that the convergence was driven primarily by entry, exit and ownership switches, rather than expansions or downsizing of existing hospitals.
A model of ownership choice
Ownership status, whether for-profit or nonprofit, represents a choice. Two choice mechanisms have been proposed in the nonprofit literature to explain a mixed-ownership equilibrium. The first traces ownership-type choice back to intrinsic differences in objectives across individuals and often identifies a "residual claimant" in nonprofit hospitals. 8 The second stream of literature argues that the choice of ownership status need not depend on a priori differences in objectives. It can result from balancing the benefits and drawbacks of each status under uncertainty and incomplete markets for risk. 9 The theoretical model presented in this section relies neither on ownership specific objectives nor on incomplete information to generate an equilibrium in which both ownership types are chosen by a strictly positive fraction of hospitals. Moreover, the model highlights potential reasons for the original large difference in size between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, by emphasizing the role that a choice of regulatory status has on the choice of capacity. In addition, the model allows for subsequent convergence in hospitals' size in relation to demographic trends such as suburbanization, federal and local subsidies, legislative pressure, and the availability of government "safety net" providers.
All hospitals are assumed to produce a homogeneous service. Patients and physicians do not favor one ownership type over the other; hence, service prices and wages are equal across ownership types. 10 I use a reduced form analysis, in which all decisions for both for-profit and nonprofit firms are made in accord with the objectives of the person or group in control of the organization, which I shall refer to as the owner. 11 The owner has access to a common production technology and maximizes utility from monetary and non-monetary gains by choosing an ownership type (nonprofit status or for-profit status). Switching from one ownership type to another is assumed to be costless. In addition, if the owner chooses a nonprofit status, she will benefit from cost advantages and will be subject to a non-distribution constraint.
Cost advantages: Nonprofit hospitals benefit from tax-exemptions, government grants, and access to tax-exempt capital financing. 12 Hansmann (1987) finds that "tax exemption offers nonprofit firms a significant advantage in establishing market share vis-à-vis for-profit firms offering similar services." Debt has traditionally been the most important source of external capital for private hospitals (Institute of Medicine 1986). Federal and state laws permit private nonprofit hospitals to issue tax-exempt bonds through local and state governments. This allows these hospitals to borrow money at substantially lower rates than for-profit borrowers, because bondholders need not pay taxes on the bond interest income. 13 Formally, I model all the economic advantages of nonprofit firms through access to lower capital prices.
Non-distribution constraint: Cash income for nonprofit owners is constrained to be zero. The owner can, however, draw non-cash income in the form of perquisites such as a luxurious office and a company car. In other words, nonprofit firms can modify the form in which they pay out profits, by converting monetary income into perks, or "dividends-inkind" (Pauly 1987) . 14 Eckel and Steinberg (1993) point out that although the alleged purpose of the non-distribution constraint is to prevent excessive perks, it is difficult to enforce proscriptions against excessive non-cash benefits paid to managers. Ortmann and Schlesinger (2002) claim that there is little in the nonprofit regulatory status to reduce the threat of fraud. 15 A key assumption made in this analysis is that the utility from cash is at least as high as the utility from perks. 16 Define π as profit and δ as a parameter, bounded between zero and one. δπ represents the income that would provide the same level of utility as π dollars spent on perks. The owner of a for-profit firm derives utility from the firm's profits, U FP = π FP . On the other hand, the utility for the nonprofit firm can be written as U NFP = δπ NFP .
Firms can take on one of three ownership types; private for-profit, private nonprofit, or public/government. There are G government firms and N private firms, out of which n are for-profit firms and the remaining N − n, are nonprofit firms. All N + G firms in the economy are assumed to compete in quantities (Cournot competition). However, I treat the number of government firms and their quantity choices as given (i.e. not subject to a participation constraint).
Localized competition with relatively high barriers to entry, due to regulation, licensing and high setup costs is usually studied using models of imperfect competition, such as the Cournot model. 17 Moreover, health insurance, third-party payment (Wu 1992) , and physician-induced demand (Roemer 1961; Fuchs 1978 ) may lower patients' sensitivity to price. For example, Dranove and White (1999) argue that patients' decisions about which hospital 12 Arrow (1963) argues that "Departure from the profit motive is strikingly manifested by the overwhelming predominance of nonprofit over proprietary hospitals … The simplest explanation is that public and private subsidies decrease the cost to the patient in nonprofit hospitals." 13 Wu (1992) discusses the cost advantages that nonprofit firms have over for-profit firms due to their ability to raise capital through the sale of tax-exempt bonds. 14 Inefficiencies do not qualify as perks in this model since perks are not embedded in the production process but rather funded through surplus. 15 The authors suggest that resources meant for a particular purpose might be misappropriated towards other purposes, typically self-serving ones. 16 Here I assume that all perks can be purchased with cash. Note that once the firm has access to lower prices for certain goods or services than the individual employee has (e.g. the firm can often bargain for better insurance premium rates) we might have higher utility from perks relative to cash. Nevertheless, for-profit firms can modify the form in which they pay out all or some of their profits. This allows for-profits to mimic the behavior of nonprofit firms whenever perks are superior to cash. 17 Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1999) argue that nonprofit hospitals will exercise market power if they can. Simpson and Shin (1998) argue that nonprofit hospitals may still exercise market power even if their primary objective is not to maximize managers' profit.
to use were based on convenience of access rather than price. 18 Likewise, there is no conclusive empirical evidence indicating that nonprofit providers enjoy a price premium despite the attention that has been devoted to competition in quality in the literature (Philipson 2000) . 19 The symmetric properties of the Cournot model will entail that all firms with common ownership type choose the same output level. Define total industry output, Y, as;
( 1) where y h is the individual firm's production level, h ∈ [FP, NFP, G] . 20 The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear and take the form p(Y ) = α −βY , where α and β are demand shifters and p is output price. A private firm i ∈ N of ownership type h will maximize its profits by choosing y i,h . 21
Denote the marginal cost for ownership type h as,
≡ C h In the optimum two sets of first-order conditions are satisfied. As marginal cost varies by ownership type, there are n first-order conditions of the type: α − βY − βy i,FP − C FP = 0 and (N − n) first-order conditions of the type: α − βY − βy i,NFP − C NFP = 0. Summing the first-order conditions over all N private firms, imposing symmetry within ownership type and using the industry output definition in (1) we can rewrite the industry output as 22 ;
Plugging (2) back into the first order conditions we get the output choice of for-profit and nonprofit firms.
For simplicity, assume that the production function for the individual firm exhibits constant returns to scale. 23 Nonprofit firms are assumed to have access to lower capital prices, r FP > r NFP . 24 With constant returns to scale the difference in marginal costs across ownership-types, (C FP − C NFP ) will be positive for any level of output and its magnitude will depend on both the difference in capital prices and the form of the production function (e.g. the capital intensity).
Since the output choice of for-profit firms is negatively related to the proportion of nonprofit firms while the output choice of nonprofit firms is positively related to the proportion of for-profit firms, conversion from nonprofit status to for-profit status will lead to higher output levels for both types. However, from (2) we see that the total industry output is negatively related to the share of for-profit firms. 25
Lemma 1 Regardless of the proportion of private firms in the economy, N, the production level in the government sector, Gy G , or the presence of a non-distribution constraint, a nonprofit firm will produce more than a for-profit firm when tax exemptions/subsidies are non-zero. 26 The rationale is fairly simple; the nonprofit firm enjoys a competitive advantage in that it has lower production costs. It exploits this cost advantage by increasing production. As quantities are strategic substitutes, the choice of output by nonprofit firms in turn induces a reduction in output by for-profit firms. 27 Subsidies and tax-exemptions for nonprofit firms increase their minimum efficient scale, and affect their choice of inputs mix. Since utility maximization corresponds to profit maximization, the non-distribution constraint does not play a role in the choice of capacity. 28 Figure 1 in section "The dynamics of the US hospital market" documents the convergence in size between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals by featuring the behavior over time of the nonprofit-to-for-profit size ratio. In this model, all firms with identical ownership-type choose the same level of output/capacity, so this ratio is simply; R y ≡ y NFP /y FP .
Market equilibrium
In order to study the determinants of the convergence process, a definition of market equilibrium is needed. Changes to relative size affect the relative profitability and hence alter the incentives for choosing ownership type.
Nonprofit firms are bigger and generate more surplus, as profits equal one-half times output squared, π h = 1/2 · y 2 h , where h ∈ [FP, NFP] . 29 This has to hold in equilibrium, since nonprofit firms turn the higher surplus into perks, and perks generate lower utility rel-24 This is also true for property tax exemptions. The lower capital price will affect efficiency by encouraging a shift in the input mix of nonprofit firms towards capital. 25 Although all firms increase their scale (individual-firm effect) the mix of nonprofit and for-profit firms is changed (composition effect). Industry output falls with switching from nonprofit to for-profit status as the composition effects dominate the individual-firm effect. 26 For proof see Appendix A. 27 Another way to obtain the same result is by rearranging the first order condition, such that p(Y ) (1 + s h /ε) = C h where s h is the share of industry output produced by firm of ownership type h and ε is the demand elasticity. The nonprofit firms having lower marginal costs are expected to have higher share of industry output. 28 In some models the non-distribution constraint is assumed to induce nonprofit firms to channel their surplus into additional output. 29 In its 1998 report, the U.S. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), argued that nonprofit hospitals were more profitable than for-profit hospitals between 1988 and 1990. ative to cash. Utility from perks (as a nonprofit firm) has to be higher than the utility from cash (as a for-profit firm) for owners to choose a nonprofit status.
The owner will choose a nonprofit status if and only if, U NFP = δπ NFP > π FP = U FP . If all owners face identical δ, the condition above will either hold or fail for all potential owners. Mixed equilibrium is ruled out as all firms choose the same ownership status. Moreover, this implies a constant profit ratio, as the profit ratio equals the output ratio squared; the output ratio is also constant and equals R y = √ δ
. In what follows, δ is allowed to vary across firms. Possible reasons for such heterogeneity in δ might arise from different degrees of scrutiny by local communities (e.g. the degree of monitoring of the nonprofit mission by its trustees) or different levels of regulatory involvement (e.g. the attention given to mergers and acquisitions involving nonprofit hospitals varies from one State Attorney General to another), or they may simply mean that some firms are better than others at transforming cash into perks. This may also be a feature of local characteristics, as some perks are not available in all areas. While one may argue that heterogeneity in δ may represent variation in orientation (e.g. taste for charity care), the modeling of δ does not correspond to the conventional representation of altruism, quantity (and/or quality) preferences, or "empire-building motives" in the literature. This is because a higher δ does not imply a stronger tendency to substitute profits for quantity. 30 Owners with different δs who choose a given ownership status would produce identical levels of output. That is, δ affects the choice of ownership type, but once this status is determined, δ has no effect on the level of production. If δ was related to mission or objectives, we would expect a more altruistic nonprofit hospital to produce more than a less altruistic nonprofit hospital.
Assuming δ is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, the share of for-profit firms will be given by:
The for-profit-to-nonprofit profit ratio, R p (n), has to equal to the for-profit share, n/N , (out of all private hospitals). n/N is compact and convex, and R p : n/N → n/N a continuous function. Therefore R p has a fixed point. The fixed point, E 1 in Fig. 3 represents the mixed ownership equilibrium, as it lies both on the 45 • degree line (the cumulative distribution function of a uniform (0, 1)) and on the for-profit-to-nonprofit profit ratio function. 31 Comparative-static analysis
The purpose of this section is to compare different equilibrium states that are associated with different values of exogenous variables. More specifically, this section studies how conversion from nonprofit to for-profit status, demographic changes, changes in government subsidies and crowding out of government beds affect the convergence process. In order to study the convergence process, denote demand and supply shifters by s. The ratio of average sizes corresponds to the share of for-profit hospital in the following way:
30 δ need not be a characteristic of firms' objectives but rather of firms' technology.
31 Also note that since A shock that increases the profit-ratio, R p (n) decreases the size-ratio, R y (n) and would lead to a disequilibrium, as the incentive to become a for-profit firm increases. As a result, the share of for-profit firms, which is determined endogenously, increases until a new equilibrium level is attained.
Note that no additional insight with regard to the process of adjustment is offered, as this is merely a comparison of two equilibrium states. Net conversion from nonprofit to for-profit type plays an important role in clearing the ownership-market. The direction of the effect of switches from nonprofit to for-profit status on the growing similarity between the two types of firms is fully captured by the sign of the partial derivative of R y with respect to the number of for-profit firms, n. 32 Lemma 2 When tax exemptions/subsidies are non-zero, conversion from nonprofit to forprofit status leads to convergence in size, regardless of the number of private firms in the economy, N, the production level in the government sector, Gy G , and the presence of a non-distribution constraint. 33 Following lemma 1, where I assert that R y > 1, lemma 2 claims that ownership switching is one possible driving force behind the convergence in size. Furthermore, the second derivative of R y with respect to n is positive, indicating that the convergence process slows as the share of for-profit firms increases.
In this formulation there are two potential demand shifters, α and β, the intercept and slope of the linear inverse demand function respectively. 34 When α increases, demand shifts out and in turn induces higher levels of production in both for-profit and nonprofit firms. All firms have equal absolute change in capacity, yet for-profit firms will experience a higher percentage change, due to their relatively smaller scale. This is potentially important as during the study period, population growth occurred more rapidly in the suburbs than in central cities in the U.S. In addition, suburbs tend to have higher average income per capita than their respective central cities. This mechanism would suggest a simultaneous increase in α and a decrease in β. Note that when β decreases demand pivots upwards. If government hospitals are absent from the market (i.e. Gy G = 0) the effect of a change in β induces a proportional change in scale across ownership types and the size ratio, R y is unaffected. However, when government hospitals are present in the market, and are less sensitive to shocks relative to their private counterparts, a decrease in β does lead to convergence in capacity. 35 Moreover, a negative supply shock represented by a decrease in the total number of public beds, Gy G , will have similar effects on convergence as an increase in α, and hence will result in convergence. 36 A negative supply shock to the government providers would have similar properties as a positive demand shock.
Likewise, when the number of private firms, N , increases the profit-ratio, R p shifts downwards, subsequently, the share of for-profit firms falls and the size ratio expands. In other words, exit stimulates the growing similarity in size. Markets with fewer hospitals would tend to have a lower share of nonprofit hospitals. In such markets, differences in capacity across ownership types are minimal. This result coincides with Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) model, in which "the share of nonprofit firms rises with the number of firms in the industry." In both formulations, entry reduces the relative attractiveness of the for-profit status.
Finally, when cost advantages of nonprofit firms decrease, due to lower availability of government funds and subsidies, for-profit firms and non-profit converge in size. However, this particular shifter does not trigger differential growth rates but rather has a positive effect on the scale of for-profit firms and a negative effect on the scale of nonprofit firms. This is the only shifter in this model, consistent with the convergence pattern that followed the introduction of the Prospective Payment System (PPS).
The model presented in this section stresses the cost advantages of nonprofit firms, and the constraints these firms face in terms of paying out profits as the key trade-off determining the mixed-ownership equilibrium. This simple model appears to be flexible enough to account for the static differences between for-profits and nonprofits, as well as the dynamics of the convergence in capacity. The model allows different potential shifters to shape the convergence trend in ways that correspond to both the period prior to the introduction of the PPS and successive periods.
Empirical analysis
By employing both hospital-level and demographic data, this section tests the extent to which measures of the model's parameters explain the convergence in capacity by exploiting variation across different geographical areas. Hospital-level data are collected by the American Hospital Association (AHA). For the purpose of this analysis, the sample is limited to com-munity hospitals that provide short-term general care. 37 Community hospitals are facilities whose services are available to the general public. Short-term general hospitals are facilities whose primary function is to provide patient services for a variety of medical conditions. Hospitals are divided into three categories: nonprofit hospitals, for-profit hospitals, and government hospitals. 38 I consider two geographical partitions: states and metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). 39 The panel data sets at the state (including Washington, DC) and MSA levels cover the years 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998. 
Empirical framework
The model developed in the previous section suggests that nonprofit-to-for-profit size ratio is a function of demand shifters; the number of government beds in the market; the cost advantage of nonprofit firms; and the share of for-profit firms in the market, which is endogenously determined in the model. The size ratio is calculated as the average number of beds in nonprofit hospitals divided by the average number of beds in for-profit hospitals for each year and geographical area. The for-profit share corresponds to the share of for-profit facilities out of all private (for-profit and nonprofit) facilities in a given geographical area.
Equation 7 specifies the reduced form relationship between the size ratio and its determinants:
The log of the size ratio for state or MSA i in year t is regressed on the vector ln S it , which includes: log income per capita, log population size, log number of beds per capita in government hospitals and log cost difference. X t is a set of year dummies, and ε it is an independently and identically distributed error term.
37 Included in this category are all university medical centers, and both teaching and non-teaching hospitals. Excluded are all "specialty" hospitals (e.g. psychiatric hospitals, children's hospitals, respiratory disease hospitals, long-term facilities etc.). 38 Hospitals in the nonprofit category are non-governmental entities that are controlled by nonprofit organizations. These facilities include mostly hospitals operated by or affiliated with religious organizations, community hospitals, cooperative hospitals and hospitals operated by fraternal societies. Hospitals in the for-profit category are non-governmental entities that are administered on a for-profit basis, most of which are organized legally as corporations. Federal agencies, states, counties, cities and other local governments operate hospitals in the government category. Results were not affected when district hospitals were excluded from the government hospital category. 39 The Office of Management and Budget defines metropolitan areas for purposes of collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal data. The general concept of a metropolitan area is that of a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of social and economic integration with that core. 40 The states Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Vermont have no for-profit hospitals throughout the sample period. In the states Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico and Wyoming for-profit hospitals appear in several periods but not in all. In 33 states all three-ownership types appear in all years. Table 2 ) may be linked to the growth in the share of for-profit providers and could plausibly explain the convergence in size. A decrease in the number of government beds is expected to decrease the size ratio as well.
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Measuring the cost advantages of nonprofits
Another challenging task is developing a measure for the cost advantage for nonprofit hospitals. The theoretical literature provides several justifications for higher average costs in nonprofit hospitals. 42 However, empirical cost studies present mixed evidence regarding cost disparity across hospitals with different ownership types (Malani et al. 2003) . Moreover, when properly controlling for scale, input prices, taxes, case-mix severity and teaching status, these studies fail to detect systematic difference in efficiency between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals (Sloan 2000) . In the model presented in the previous section, I assume that nonprofit hospitals enjoy cost advantages over their for-profit counterparts, such that the average cost of producing healthcare in nonprofits is lower. Nevertheless, the observed costs for nonprofit firms include both the cost of producing medical services and the cost of producing perks. 43 To construct a measure of nonprofit cost advantage, I imposed the equilibrium condition in Eq. 5: π FP = δπ NFP , where δ is uniformly distributed, and hence equals the for-profit share (n/N ) in a given market. π FP is the mean actual surplus of for-profit hospitals in each geographical area. I calculate an estimate for the latent nonprofit surplus in each area by obtaining these two components and imposing the equilibrium condition above. Assuming that all hospitals in a given area face similar output prices, and using the discrepancy between reported surplus of for-profits and approximated surplus of nonprofits, a measure of nonprofit cost advantage was generated. Table 3 presents reduced-form estimates of Eq. 7. In columns 1 and 3-5, the dependent variable is the log size ratio between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. In columns 2 and 6-8, the dependent variable is the log share of for-profit hospitals. 44 All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust (Huber/White) estimates of standard errors; regressions 1 and 2 include state-fixed effects, regressions 3-8 include MSA-fixed effects, which allow for levels of the key variables to systematically differ across states/MSAs. State-level regulation, such as certificate-of-need laws, cannot be used as it is subsumed by the area fixed effects. All regressions include year fixed effects. 45 To study the potential differential effect of income and population growth in suburbs, regressions 4 and 7 replace log MSA population with log population in the central city and 42 In the quantity-quality model (Newhouse 1970 ) average costs will be higher for nonprofits since they supply higher quantity and/or quality of care. This argument carries through for the non-contractible quality models (e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer 2001) , as nonprofit firms will exert less cost-cutting effort. The physician cooperative model (Pauly and Redisch 1973) yields similar predictions. However in this case, it is the choice of input-mix that leads to higher average costs for nonprofit hospitals. 43 Williamson (1964) argues that managers use their authority to divert funds away from profit to serve their own self-interests, that is, enhance their own utility. The excess profits are absorbed as discretionary expenditure or income. Williamson suggests that managers consciously drive up the cost of production in an attempt to further their own self-interests. Note that since in the model, presented here, firms operate efficiently, their surplus will appear on the cost side, much like a fixed cost. 44 Similar results are obtained from a linear (as opposed to a log-log) model specification. The log-log specification is chosen, as the sample consists of many observations with very small values and few with much larger values. 45 Results are robust to the inclusion of an MSA's Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the number of hospitals in the MSA. Market concentration is found to be positively correlated with the size ratio, indicating that competitive markets are made of hospitals of comparable size. The parameter estimates for the state, MSA and year dummies are not reported. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% log population in the suburb. Regressions 5 and 8 replace the log of income per capita in the MSA with that of the suburbs. Because of the potential for severe multicollinearity between the two income-per capita measures (correlation = 0.972), each one enters separately into the models. Note that the cost variable is divided in two; ln Cost Dif (+), the log difference in average cost for areas, in which nonprofit hospitals have cost advantages over for-profit hospitals, zero otherwise. ln Cost Dif (−) is the log difference in average cost for areas, in which for-profit hospitals enjoy cost advantages over nonprofit hospitals, zero otherwise.
Results
The model predicts that an increase in income per capita, crowding out of government hospitals and a decline in the cost advantage of nonprofit hospitals will all have a negative effect on the size ratio and a positive effect on the for-profit share. These predictions are confirmed by all coefficients in Table 3 . Moreover, half of these coefficients are statistically significant. The regressor that yields contradictory coefficient estimates is population size, which is expected to have a negative effect on the size ratio. 46 Nevertheless, the model's prediction that population size will have a positive effect on the for-profit share is confirmed.
When explaining the size ratio by splitting the MSA population into suburban and central city population, the coefficient estimates for central city population are very similar to those for the total population, while the coefficient estimates for suburban population are negative (as predicted), yet not statistically significant. When explaining the share of for-profit hospitals in MSAs, both central city and suburban populations are positively correlated with the share of for-profit hospitals and are statistically significant. The effect of population growth in the suburbs is between two and three times larger than the effect of inner-city growth. The results remain fairly consistent when income per-capita in the MSA is replaced with that in the suburbs only, with some increase in the values of the t-stats. As expected, population growth concentrated in suburbs explains the increased share of for-profit facilities but not their relative scale (i.e. the size ratio).
In the model, the share of for-profit hospitals and the size ratio are determined simultaneously. This simultaneity makes it difficult to isolate the causal effect of changes in ownership mix on the size ratio. To deal with this difficulty I rely on the concept that areas might differ in their favoritism towards either nonprofit or for-profit healthcare providers. For example, the share of for-profit institutions in different parts of the US may be linked to area specific historical factors. Subsequently, the for-profit market share in other healthcare industries may serve as a plausible instrument for the market share of for-profit hospitals. (e.g. areas with a higher market share of for-profit hospitals are expected to also have a larger for-profit nursing home share). The share of for-profit nursing homes in a given area would be correlated with the share of for-profit hospitals in that area but presumably uncorrelated with other factors influencing the hospital size ratio. If the share of for-profit nursing homes provides an exogenous source of variation in the share of for-profit hospitals, changes in the size ratio of hospitals should not be driven by changes in the share of for-profit nursing homes. Table 4 presents estimates of the size ratio using the same data sets and covariates used in Table 3 . Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 report coefficients from a cross-sectional estimation using OLS. These columns ignore the endogeneity of for-profit share. In the other columns the share 420 G. David [2]
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In for-profit share The parameter estimates for the year dummies are not reported. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses * Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% of for-profit nursing homes is used as an instrument for the share of for-profit hospitals. 47 Columns 3, 6, 9 and 12 also include random effects. 48 When the share of for-profit hospitals is treated as exogenous, the estimated elasticity of the size ratio with respect to the for-profit share is −0.206 for the state-level analysis and between −0.292 and −0.306 for the MSA-level analysis. In other words, if the share of for-profit hospitals in the MSA doubles, the size-ratio declines by roughly 30%.
Instrumenting for the for-profit share has a pronounced effect on the estimated elasticity. At the MSA level, the estimated elasticity for size ratio lies between −0.521 and −0.647, which is twice as big as the elasticity without instrumenting. At the state level, the estimated elasticity for size ratio is −0.254, 23% bigger then the elasticity without instrumenting (−0.206) . 49 In the theory presented in the previous section I implicitly assume that private hospitals are more responsive than government hospitals to market changes and policy interventions. 50 More specifically, in markets where government hospitals are absent, changes in population proportionally affect the capacity choice of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, such that the size ratio is unaffected. On the other hand, in markets where government hospitals operate alongside for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, larger population is associated with smaller size ratio. Fortunately, the MSA-level data allows for testing this feature, as it includes both MSA-year pairs that include hospitals of all three ownership-types and MSA-year pairs that include only for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. 51 To test this effect, I add an interaction term between population size and government beds to the OLS and IV regressions for the MSAlevel. The coefficient for the resulting interaction term is negative and significant whereas the coefficient for population loses its statistical significance. 52 All coefficient estimates in Table 4 have the expected sign except for population size, which has a positive and sometime significant coefficient. Interestingly, when the MSA population is split into suburban and central city populations, the coefficient estimate for central city population is negative and in some cases statistically significant, while the coefficient estimates for suburban population are positive and not statistically significant. This reinforces the notion that omitting the interaction between population and the number of government beds may be crucial, as the vast majority of government hospitals are in central cities and not in their suburbs.
The share of for-profit hospitals and the measure of cost advantages for nonprofit hospitals are generally significant for both the state and the MSA-level regressions. Income per-capita is significant only at the state level and for the MSA suburb, while government beds per-capita is significant only at the MSA-level. 47 The share of for-profit nursing homes is computed using the 2002-2003 Nursing Home Compare survey, which includes 16,385 nursing homes nationwide. The Center of Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) collects and publishes the data. 48 Fixed effects cannot be obtained, as the share of for-profit nursing homes is measured at a point in time and therefore does not vary over time. 49 When performing a Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test at the MSA level the critical value of chisquared with 1 degree of freedom at the 5% level is 3.84. Hence, I reject the null hypothesis and conclude that OLS estimators are inconsistent. The reason for these inconsistent estimates is due to the endogeneity of the for-profit share. However, when the same test is performed at the state level I cannot reject the null hypothesis. 50 Duggan (2000) finds evidence for low responsiveness of government hospitals relative to private ones. 51 Out of the 960 MSA-year pairs that include both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, 816 (85%) also include government providers, whereas 144 (15%) include only for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. 52 See Table 5 in Appendix B for the explicit test and results.
Discussion
While private hospitals in the U.S. can organize as either nonprofit or for-profit institutions, nonprofit hospitals dominate the hospital industry with a persistently large share of beds (about 70%) over the period from 1960 to 2000. Moreover, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are subject to different regulatory rules, in particular the tax code. More specifically, nonprofit hospitals are eligible for exemptions from property, sales, and income taxes, while for-profit hospitals are required to pay these taxes. Despite these legal and regulatory distinctions, there has been growing similarity in capacity between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals during these four decades. One of the driving forces behind this growing similarity (i.e. convergence) is the number of ownership switches from nonprofit to for-profit status and vice-versa.
Failing to appreciate the dynamics of this convergence contributes to the perception that the hospital industry is somewhat stagnant with respect to ownership composition. Due to this perception, scholars often fuse hospitals' ownership status and hospitals' objectives. Therefore, it is not surprising that to some observers, for-profit hospitals symbolize profit-seeking, compassionless, and opportunistic motives, whereas nonprofit hospitals are often viewed as community-oriented, charitable institutions. Moreover, these beliefs are often used to justify preferential treatment for nonprofit hospitals. However, this notion fails to account for the convergence in capacity. More specifically, when firms essentially choose between two distinct regulatory systems, an observed discrepancy in behavior does not necessarily arise from variation in objectives. In that sense, a simple revealed-preferences argument need not work in the case of nonprofit organizations. Clearly, the quest for identifying the objectives of nonprofit hospitals is important for shaping courts' decisions, government policies, and antitrust interventions. Yet, if policymakers and legislators rely on nonfactual arguments, they might promote inefficient policy interventions. The analysis presented in this paper raises the possibility that systematic differences in behavior between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals might be a consequence of the hospitals' regulatory environment and not the product of unusual objectives. 53 There is evidence to support the notion that the regulatory environment enables and induces community-oriented behavior on the part of nonprofit hospitals. For example, Wu (1992) points out that nonprofit hospitals that received Hill-Burton funding were required to provide community services and uncompensated or charity care annually for twenty years after the date of the hospital's expansion. Likewise, in several legal cases, courts required nonprofit hospitals to provide uncompensated care and threatened to revoke their tax-exempt status if they failed to do so. Finally, Fournier and Campbell (1997) find that nonprofit hospitals are indirectly compensated for the provision of indigent care with legal protections against competition under certificate-of-need regulation. What is clear from these examples is that nonprofits' community-oriented behavior need not be altruistic or unselfish. The regulatory environment provides enough sticks and carrots to produce variation in behavior between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. For example, estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxation put the 2002 value of federal, state and local tax exemptions at $12.6 billion. While the Congressional Budget Office report stops short of offering a revenue estimate for rescinding the exemption, the sheer size of this subsidy suggests a powerful motivation for nonprofit hospitals (CBO 2006) . Moreover, if nonprofit hospitals indeed shared strong intrinsic attributes which separate them from for-profit hospitals, then evidence for that would more likely originate at the organization level rather than at the industry level. For example, if nonprofit hospitals selflessly sought to provide benefits to the communities in which they operate one would find evidence for hospital-level mechanisms that encourage and enforce such altruistic behavior. Still, Milstead (1999) finds that despite the growing focus on community benefits, most compensation plans for executives of nonprofit health care organizations do not include goals or provisions for providing such benefits. Likewise, Brickley and Van Horn (2002) find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide explicit incentives for their CEOs to focus on altruistic activities. Both articles essentially claim that the behavior of nonprofit hospitals does not seem to be induced by hospital-level built-in incentive mechanisms. In essence, it is difficult to refute the possibility that hospitals that organize as nonprofit entities might do so despite the fact that they will be more likely to face outside pressure to provide free or unprofitable services. Using this logic, the cost of free care is simply a "tax" paid out by nonprofit hospitals to the communities in which they operate.
The same can be said of for-profit hospitals. They do not have organizationally defined incentives to avoid providing benefits to the community, and yet, they pick a regulatory environment that compels them to provide a community benefit by paying taxes. Thus, both types of hospitals are forced to pay a tax of some sort for the benefit of the community. Stated differently, hospitals that choose the for-profit form do so despite the fact that they will have to pay taxes. It seems doubtful that such behavior can be traced back to their objectives in the sense that these hospitals take pleasure in paying out taxes. Tax liability is a feature of the for-profit hospitals' regulatory environment. Applying this logic to the nonprofit sector, I argue that those hospitals that organize as nonprofit entities might do so despite the fact that they will be more likely to face outside pressure to provide free or unprofitable services. The cost of free care is a "tax" paid by nonprofit hospitals to the communities in which they operate. CEOs of nonprofit hospitals are not induced to focus on altruistic activities in the same way that CEOs of for-profit hospitals do not receive a bonus for paying out corporate taxes.
Hospitals' behavior not only reflects their objectives but also corresponds to their economic, legal and political environment. The growing similarity in capacity between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals raises a conceptual obstacle for the assertion that nonprofit and forprofit hospitals have intrinsically different objectives. This is especially true when, as is currently the case, for-profit and nonprofit hospitals treat a rather similar mix of patients in addition to offering and delivering comparable services. I claim that the growing similarity between for-profits and nonprofit hospitals is the result of changing market conditions, such as crowding-out of government owned hospitals, growing population size, and changes in policy dynamics (e.g. tax code, antitrust involvement, federal and state programs). If different behavior is the result of different objectives, then growing similarity in behavior must correspond to growing similarity in objectives. Some scholars go so far as to claim that nonprofit hospitals, "in pursuing the business mission… will lose their identity, their soul, and perhaps their tax-exempt status" (Jones and Du Val 1988 ). Yet, according to Stigler and Becker (1977) the treatment of individual preferences as constant is more valuable and credible for finding an economic reason for observed market changes. 54 In this growing similarity between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, a significant role is attributed to ownership-type switches. This is especially true for the period after the introduction of the prospective payment system, when relatively large nonprofit hospitals converted to for-profit status and hence made the typical for-profit and nonprofit hospital more comparable. But why switch? Did the entrepreneur become benevolent or did the altruist become self-centered? Or were those that switched to nonprofit "for-profits in disguise"? It is particularly challenging to explain switching behavior when relying on the assertion that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals exhibit strong systematic differences in objectives. However, the fact that nonprofit and for-profit providers are subject to different regulatory rules in a changing environment may explain observed differences in behavior over time, as well as ownershiptype switches.
When one syntactically splits the objectives of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals into altruistic and opportunistic ones respectively, the notion of mixed-ownership equilibrium becomes rather trivial. In this view, the demand for nonprofit hospitals' services would be fairly detached from the demand for for-profit hospitals' services, as these services are differentiated. This notion of mixed-ownership equilibrium is straightforward in a static perspective; the dynamics of convergence and conversions, however, raise doubts regarding the validity of such arguments. To avoid such a limitation, the model presented in this paper considers the uniform goal of surplus maximization for both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. The healthcare industry is viewed as offering private firms a choice between two alternative ownership statuses; a firm's selection of ownership type is viewed as a vehicle to reach its objectives rather than a reflection of those objectives.
If switching from nonprofit to for-profit status makes the nonprofit status less attractive, a stable-equilibrium notion must hinge on the assumption of heterogeneity among hospitals or among consumers. In my formulation, this heterogeneity is represented by variation in the ability to benefit from a given ownership type rather than a variation in the propensity to trade off hospital-level profits for the promotion of community interests.
Guarding such community interests, policymakers and legislators need a clear view of what for-profit and nonprofit hospitals represent in order to effectively promote goals such as access to care, quality of services and fair competition (David and Helmchen 2006; Capps et al. 2009 ). In my view, relying on the idea that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals differ in their objectives, produces a rather weak justification for favoring nonprofit providers, by granting them special tax treatment. In fact, preferential treatment for nonprofit hospitals would be more valuable for society if nonprofit hospitals' community-oriented behavior was induced by their unique regulatory status rather than by their unique objectives. For example, if different tax treatment induced different behavior and such taxation dissimilarities were eliminated, one would expect to see a dramatic change in the behavior of nonprofit hospitals. On the other hand, one would expect a much smaller change in behavior if originally this behavior reflected nonprofit hospitals' mission to benefit society.
In conclusion, the regulatory environment appears to play a key role in explaining differences in behavior between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. The fact that nonprofit and for-profit providers compete in the same markets, yet are subject to different regulatory rules, casts doubt on the idea that observed differences in behavior between the two types of hospitals could be used to reveal their objectives.
Conclusion
In this paper, I provide evidence of the growing similarity in capacity between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Convergence in both the average size and the size distribution persists over the period of 1960 to 2000 and survived certificate-of-need regulation, the prospective payment reimbursement system and the expansion of managed care. This paper highlights a novel conceptualization, in which firms have identical objectives yet differ in their ability to benefit from a given ownership status. In this model, the role of localized competition, demographic changes, crowding out of government hospitals, the cost advantage of nonprofit hospitals and the share of for-profit hospitals all contribute to explaining the growing similarity among private hospitals. The empirical analysis in section "Empirical analysis" examines the growing similarity in size over the 1970-1998 period. Tables 3 and 4 report results from estimating the theoretical model at the state and metropolitan statistical area levels. Results in this section indicate that variations in demand, government provision of hospital services, share of for-profit hospitals and cost advantages for nonprofit hospitals explain much of the convergence in size between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. For the most part, the directions of these effects are consistent with the theory I laid out in section "A model of ownership choice". Overall, the evidence presented in this part is more suggestive than definitive. More specifically, the empirical analysis does not refute alternative conceptualizations, such as the altruism model. Nevertheless, it generally does support the implications of the model. There is little doubt that hospitals, whether forprofit or nonprofit, possess unique features that require them to balance economic, ethical, professional and public considerations. Yet, whether or not nonprofit and for-profit hospitals have intrinsically different objectives remains an open question. In fact, there is no conceptual need to rely on differences in objectives in order to explain the growing similarity in capacity, which is documented in this paper, or the coexistence of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. In particular, this paper produces similar predictions using standard economic logic by relying on uniformity in objectives across ownership type. It is fairly easy to show that the second derivative is positive; hence the convergence process has a concave shape, which corresponds to the observed trends, Figs. 1 and 2. The results from this test highlight the effect that government hospitals' presence has on the way in which demand shocks affect the convergence trend. The test provides additional evidence for the lower responsiveness of public hospitals relative to private ones. Nevertheless, note that this is a test of the model's assumptions rather than the model's predictions.
